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(Case called)

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THE COURT: Is the only case on today the Orange County audit history?

MR. AXLINE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you in that case, Mr. Cepeda?

MR. CEPEDA: No, your Honor. But by the time it was confirmed, I was already on the plane, so I might as well show up.

THE COURT: Is there a particular issue that we could get out of the way?

MR. CEPEDA: No. I'm fine just listening in.

THE COURT: We are not going to do Puerto Rico today, but thank you for coming.

The only issue I know about is the station matrix problem, continuing problem with the station matrix. In particular, Tesoro and Lyondell have both written saying there is no evidence they know of against their clients to which plaintiffs say commingled product.

I didn't realize, and neither did the defendants, that plaintiffs are intending to rely on the commingled product theory. I thought plaintiff has always said in this case that it wasn't relying on an alternative theory of liability and that it could do product identification, which is what the station matrix was all about. So we do have a couple of topics.

Let's put aside Lyondell and Tesoro initially and see what else we have to talk about. For the rest of you who aren't Lyondell or Tesoro, tell me what your problem is if you are not with one of those companies.

MS. ROY: Whitney Roy, representing ExxonMobil
Corporation. We have been talking about a tentative
stipulation with plaintiff that would resolve a lot of the
issues that we were concerned about when we came to you last
time.

THE COURT: Right.

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MS. ROY: There may be a deal breaker issue. The proposal we received from the plaintiff is that for each of the stations, the defendant that owned or operated or is basically the obvious anchor tenant of that station would stipulate to their dates that they were on the property. In return, for other stations where they are just targeted based on some sort of allegation of supply to the station, the plaintiff would walk away from those claims and dismiss them.

If we were able to get through a stipulation that works for everyone, that would resolve a lot of the issues we were concerned about for summary judgment and would streamline the motions substantially.

THE COURT: That would mean that the plaintiffs would decide not to go after suppliers unless the supplier is the same company as the owner of the station. But short of that,

they would agree not to go after suppliers.

MS. ROY: There are some instance where the anchor tenant is only there because they are a supplier but they are the majority supplier or they are a much bigger share and direct supplier to the station.

The deal breaker point, though, is that the defendants would want the dismissal of those other stations or claims on other stations to be with prejudice. As you can imagine, that would be something we want. Plaintiff is wrestling with that issue.

We have not gotten firm confirmation from them of that. We are sending of them a draft of a stipulation by Friday. If we can reach a resolution on prejudice, the motions will be streamlined and we will have accomplished some. If the with-prejudice agreement doesn't come through, then the stipulation is going to be thrown out the door and we will have to submit motions that are substantial. That's where we stand on that issue.

There are three independent stations.

THE COURT: Why don't we pause there for a moment. Mr. Axline, is your client leaning toward agreeing to with-prejudice dismissal or have you rejected it out of hand and there is no point until waiting until Friday?

MR. AXLINE: No, we haven't rejected it out of hand, your Honor. Our objective here is to allow the defendants to

1 present their motions in the most efficient way possible given 2 your prior rulings. But we also have to preserve our record in 3 that process. I'll tell you, frankly, my concern with the 4 with-prejudice point is that if we can come up with language 5 that would preserve our ability to pursue the claims should there be a reversal on appeal of the reasons that we are 6 7 stipulating, I think we are going to be able to get there. 8 That is our objective.

THE COURT: I'm not quite sure I understand that to be with prejudice. What you are saying is you would agree to dismiss with prejudice but reserve the right that if there was an appeal of my ruling and it was reversed, that could vacate the stipulation, essentially?

MR. AXLINE: Yes, in substance.

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THE COURT: Are defendants going to be interested in that idea?

MS. ROY: Your Honor, the problem is that the rulings that we are talking about are rulings from the City of Fresno case.

THE COURT: That's OK. He is still saying that's only a matter of lawyer drafting. He is saying should the underlying ruling that created the thought that it should be with prejudice and — what other parts of the ruling would you be referring to, Mr. Axline?

MR. AXLINE: That's it.

THE COURT: That's it. There are a lot of things that
can happen on the way. The case could settle, it may never get
appealed, you may not win the appeal. A lot of things could
happen. But he is saying in the event that he actually pursues
an appeal way down the road and is successful, that would
vacate the stipulation.

MS. ROY: I understand.

THE COURT: The chances of all the steps happening may be somewhat slim.

MS. ROY: One of the proposals I made was that perhaps if they could identify specific opinions that they are wanting to reserve and if we can get to language that everyone is comfortable with, then we will have a stipulation. We are just not there yet. We need a couple more days.

THE COURT: So it is possible that the outlines of what he just said could be acceptable?

MS. ROY: It all comes down to language, once we see in it writing.

THE COURT: It is also concept. The concept is to preserve the plaintiff's right to appeal that ruling. Yes, he would identify the ruling, and yes, you would have to work out the language. But the concept is fairly simple to me. You will dismiss with prejudice but subject to the right to appeal a ruling in a different case. It is California. Should it be reversed, that would vacate the stipulation of dismissal with

1 | prejudice.

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MS. ROY: Understood. That is a plausible agreement. I can't speak for all the defendants on this point. It was something that we just discussed out in the hallway.

THE COURT: I see. Mr. Axline, can you identify the opinion that you are talking about, opinion or opinions?

MR. AXLINE: Yes.

THE COURT: Now?

MR. AXLINE: Yes. There were rulings in the Fresno case on commingled product. There was a ruling on the statute of limitations in the Orange County Water District case, an earlier ruling in the Orange County Water District case that the defendants are invoking and which we don't want to have this Court have to visit again on additional stations. Those are the rulings that we are talking about.

THE COURT: You could be more specific by date and docket number at another time.

MR. AXLINE: Yes. I think that would go into the stipulation. I think that Ms. Roy's proposal makes sense. I just heard it in the hallway.

THE COURT: That was her proposal about preserving the right to appeal? No.

MR. AXLINE: It was her proposal to specify the rulings.

THE COURT: All right.

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MS. ROY: It is obviously something we will need to discuss with our clients once we see the exact orders, but that helps.

THE COURT: Given that it is still in negotiations, I realize you have all come here, but does it make sense to spend any more time on the defendants other than Lyondell and Tesoro, since you may be on the verge of an agreement?

MS. ROY: Yes, your Honor, there is a remaining issue. The stipulation does not address all of the stations. There are three independent stations and two Thrifty stations where they would not be subject to the stipulation. We have been asking, as we have told you before, for plaintiff to provide us with the evidence they are relying on to get our gas to those stations. We have still not received it.

THE COURT: Mr. Axline, that is not right. The whole idea was to do it before everybody traveled here today. What evidence do you have AT those three independent stations and two Thrifty stations that, for example, the Exxon gas was there? What do you have? What theory is that? Are you talking about an alternative theory? Are you talking about a supplier situation? What are you talking about?

MR. AXLINE: We are talking about an alternative theory at those stations, your Honor, the commingled products, as we informed the defendants at the first session.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I missed that.

MR. AXLINE: As we informed the defendants at the 1 2 meeting, the first session. 3 THE COURT: What was the meeting first session? 4 MR. AXLINE: On April 8th. 5 THE COURT: It wasn't until April 8, 2014, that you first raised commingled product in this case? 6 7 MR. AXLINE: No, your Honor. 8 THE COURT: This is an '04 case. It sounds like it's 9 ten years old. Go ahead. 10 MR. AXLINE: Unlike the Fresno case, the defendants didn't submit contention interrogatories to the district in 11 this case. The meet-and-confer session was the first 12 13 opportunity to discuss with the defendants the evidence upon 14 which we were going to base our claims with respect to 15 commingled product. It was the first time we had discussed 16 their summary judgment motions. It is not like they asked us 17 are you going to invoke the commingled product theory and we 18 said no. They did not do that. 19 THE COURT: And you never represented you weren't 20 going to use it? 21 MR. AXLINE: It never came up specifically. 22 THE COURT: I'm asking you. You never made a

representation that you weren't going to use it in this case?

MR. AXLINE: No, we did not.

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THE COURT: Ms. Roy, your question seems to be

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contrary to rule 33(a)(2).

market share liability or commingled product liability." THE COURT: The answer? MR. CORRELL: They objected. They said it was

1 MR. AXLINE: This was a very early interrogatory.

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THE COURT: I realize it is. It is probably contrary to our local rule.

MR. CORRELL: The answers were May 14, 2010. That's six years after the case was filed.

THE COURT: True. I'm saying it probably does violate our local rule, but nobody came to me and moved to compel an answer. Or, if you had an objection and they didn't answer you, you should have come in and said they are objecting under this rule as an improper interrogatory, will you overrule the objection and compel them to answer.

So they never denied, they just objected. It seems to me that under our rule, which is very limited on interrogatories, it was probably an appropriate objection.

Unless you had asked me to overrule it, and then I would have said while it is an appropriate objection in this case, it would be wise to know, you have to answer. But that never happened.

Given that you had an objection, not a denial, I don't think I can say that Mr. Axline misled you. All he did was object to your question. He didn't deny that he was going to use it.

MR. CORRELL: He just told the Court that the reason for the first time he disclosed was on April 8th was that we had never asked.

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THE COURT: That was a mistake. You asked, they objected. They did ask. There is no point going over that. He objected, he didn't deny, so there is no contradiction. I still say once you got that objection, you should have come to me.

MS. DOYLE: On behalf of Tesoro, to clarify, your Honor, if anything, we were misled. There are a number of occasions where it is obvious that they were not pursuing the commingled product theory. We cite in the footnote in our letter to you there is a 2006 letter where Tracy O'Reilly for the plaintiffs' counsel is saying that basically we have done this before in the South Tahoe case and we can do it again, we can trace gas. That's one thing.

THE COURT: I don't know if it is helpful now to tell me, basically. If you want to quote something she said from a letter, quote it. You are accusing her of misleading you, therefore the Court. I would have to hear the exact words.

MS. DOYLE: This is in a footnote to our letter. I'll read it to you. It is to Special Master Warner. There is a question about operator information and jobber information that the parties are trying to obtain for purposes, frankly, of product tracing.

She says, "First, the majority of the defendants in the district's case owned and operated refineries that supplied gasoline to the district service area over a long period of

time. South Tahoe's counsel, defense counsel in this matter, was able to connect every refiner defendant to each and every gasoline station in addition." That's 2006.

In 2010 --

THE COURT: Wait. I didn't hear any misleading there.

MS. DOYLE: She is responding to Special Master
Warner's question about how they were going to do it in terms
of the jobber, how they were going to basically connect the
dots of the refiners and other defendants to the stations.

THE COURT: Maybe I'm too generous, but the way I hear that is we were able to do it in another case, so the inference is we'll do our best to do it here. I didn't hear misleading. I guess they are saying where they can do it, they are going to do it.

MS. DOYLE: Your Honor, the next point is, from Mr. Axline to us, to Tesoro, in a June 24, 2010 letter, he says that it was a letter to Tesoro in which plaintiff identifies the largest distributors and the relevant geographic area, and at a telephonic conference before the special master after the close of fact discovery, the Special Master Warner asked, "Except, you know, the relief requested that an order compelling all CWV to confirm the identities of the jobbers to whom they issued subpoenas. So that's not difficult, right? You can do that. Mr. Axline says, we can do that."

That was specifically again because they wanted

1 | information from jobbers that we use to tie us to the stations

THE COURT: Again, that makes sense. If you can do it, make every effort possible to do it. The only fallback on the alternative theory is when you can't do it. He said, we will try to do that, there were subpoenas out. I understand he wanted to pursue it.

It's an easier case. If you can get the direct proof, obviously it is an easier case to try and less risky from a legal perspective. But I don't hear a denial yet that would say at the end of the day when they weren't able to do it, that they are precluded from being able to apply the commingled theory.

MS. DOYLE: Your Honor, I don't know if we want to get into this part of the argument at this point in time without the Tesoro and commingled product theory --

THE COURT: I guess so.

MS. DOYLE: For them to raise commingled product theory essentially at the eleventh hour is I think is a disgrace. You know why I think it is a disgrace? For several months prior to the close of fact discovery, plaintiffs' counsel noticed 40-plus deposition notices for owners and operators of stations at issue on the matrix, 34 stations. Not only that, they also had in excess I believe of 80 jobbers that were identified by all the defendants sitting in this room, and they never, ever pursued those jobbers on any of this stuff.

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MS. DOYLE: Correct, your Honor. For us, Tesoro, they have never connected the dots. This was exactly the same situation Tesoro was in in the City of Fresno case. They have never ever been able to show us the evidence that links Tesoro gasoline to any of the 34 stations.

We are in a position, your Honor, when the time is set, that we will file motions for summary judgment as to all 34 stations. That is the position that we are put in and that's what we will do. It is unfortunate. We had hoped that

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we would be able to narrow the number of stations, but we have not been able to.

THE COURT: Is Lyondell in the same position?

MR DiCHELLO: Your Honor, we are also in the same position as Ms. Doyle indicated. Plaintiff essentially started the process of trying to trace with respect to Lyondell and just never finished it. We would likely move on all sites as well.

MS. DOYLE: Your Honor, the last point I will make about the commingled, based on your ruling in Fresno and some other cases, if there is a defendant or defendants associated with a station, if you have an anchor defendant like we were just talking about in terms of like the stipulation, if you have an anchor defendant or two or three, they should not be able to pursue a commingled product theory.

THE COURT: I don't know if that's right. Just because there are some defendants as to which you have direct evidence that it was their product on the premises doesn't mean that there weren't suppliers and the suppliers had a commingled product and everybody who was part of that commingled product has a share of the liability.

It is going back too many years, but I remember when this whole commingled product started, you can also exculpate yourself. There is a burden shifting built in, if I recall my own theory from years ago. After they are allowed to use it,

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THE COURT: OCWD is a plume case.

MR. AXLINE: Yes, unlike Fresno. Fresno is simply a station case. The districts interested in the groundwater are significantly more responsive, I think, than the City of

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gasoline is much more complex than was involved in the City of

Fresno's. The southern California system for delivery of

Fresno. In that sense it is much more akin to Suffolk County.

We believe Suffolk County was also a plume case.

We did make extensive efforts to conduct discovery against jobbers or other methods of connecting terminals directly to stations.

THE COURT: Ms. Doyle just told me how you quit, had 40 subpoenas out or deposition notices or 80 of them, either 40 in one category, 80 of another, and then just didn't pursue them.

MR. AXLINE: We pursued a number of subpoenas. In fact, we got some records from subpoenas for the largest.

THE COURT: What you did do is not of interest. She is pointing out what you didn't do. I forget. You used the number 40 and 80.

MS. DOYLE: 40 owner/operator deposition notices, at least 40, and then at least 80 jobbers.

THE COURT: That is the group she said you didn't pursue, the 40 owner/operator, 80 jobbers, you had notices out and didn't pursue them. There is no point in telling me what you did do. That's what you didn't do.

MR. AXLINE: I think what we did do is relevant in this sense. The law does not permit you to do a useless act.

By the time Orange County Water District came up, the retention

of records by jobbers as compared to what the situation was in Tahoe was significantly less.

The jobbers that we spent the time to pursue who were the most obvious targets, had no records. There was no reason for them to keep those records. The question of whether we should have continued to pursue that in light of what we had already learned I think is a legitimate question as to the question of impossibility.

In addition to the question of impossibility, we have asked these defendants repeatedly for those kinds of records, and they have, without saying -- well, it's a mixed bag, so I hate to generalize. If you will take it as a generalization, they haven't responded or they have said we don't have them.

I think we are going to be able to show impossibility. We are going to be able to show much higher volume of product by the commingled product defendants being sold into the relevant geographic area, which makes it similar to Suffolk County. It was sold into the relevant geographic area for a much longer period of time, more like Suffolk County again than Fresno.

THE COURT: What about that last argument that one of the lawyers made, I don't remember which of the three, that if you have an anchor defendant who is primarily liable or one or two others at the station, that should be it? Was that you, Ms. Doyle, who said that?

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MS. DOYLE: Yes, your Honor. I was actually citing from the City of Fresno decision, your Honor' decision.

MR. AXLINE: I have two responses. One is that at some of the stations we have an anchor defendant for a period of time, but for another period of time when released occurred we do not have an anchor defendant.

THE COURT: Let's stop with when you do. Is Ms. Doyle right? Apparently, she is quoting from a decision of mine in City of Fresno. If you do have an anchor defendant at a particular station theoretically for the whole period of time or at some station for a period of time, in that instance do you not have the opportunity to try to go after suppliers on an alternative theory of commingled product? To you agree with her at least to that extent?

MR. AXLINE: At a number of those stations those anchor defendants purchased copious amounts of either MTBE or MTBE gasoline from the commingled product defendants. What we are being asked to do is to voluntarily dismiss as to these defendants. We are not willing to do that.

THE COURT: You don't agree with her that even when you do have an anchor defendant, so the hypothetical would be you have one or more at a particular station for the entire period of time, even there you would go after those who supplied the commingled product?

MR. AXLINE: Even there we are not willing to dismiss

the claims against the suppliers.

THE COURT: Ms. Doyle disagrees with you even on the proposition that if he can't identify the anchor defendant or defendants, he still thinks he can pursue the suppliers. I don't know what you are quoting from. I have written so many opinions over so many years. It may by getting close to, who knows, a hundred. I don't know which decision in the City of Fresno you are referring to or what quote from it.

MS. DOYLE: Your Honor, this was on the causation motion.

THE COURT: That won't help me. If you have it in front of you.

MS. DOYLE: I have the cite.

THE COURT: Do you have a date?

MS. DOYLE: I'm sorry, your Honor, I do not have the date of the Fresno decision. I apologize.

THE COURT: That's OK. What was the quote?

MS. DOYLE: It says, "The commingled product theory is a theory of liability that, quote, shifts the burden of proof to the defendant only in circumstances where, quote, each defendant acted purposely but which of the defendants caused injury is uncertain. In other words, it applies only when the plaintiff can, quote, establish the other elements of a prima facie case against a number of defendants, unquote, that cannot, quote, identify the exact defendant who caused the

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MR. CORRELL: Your Honor, there is one other issue. In these interrogatories also ask in interrogatory number 3 for each defendant that you claim caused damage to any plume, give us the facts. They gave us the tracing facts: For Chevron, you branded this station, you supplied this station. But any

fact upon which Mr. Axline now contends that the commingled 1 2 product should be used, i.e., you just delivered this terminal 3 and it got put on this jobber's truck that went wherever, those 4 aren't disclosed.

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We are now at the summary judgment stage and we are really shadow boxing. For example, for Chevron he alleges that we are liable at the Thrifty station. We have no records of our gasoline going to Thrifty. I don't understand the facts which I need to write a letter, the pre-motion letter.

THE COURT: I think we have had the pre-motion just I think what he is saying is he can't specifically move the Chevron product to the station or he wouldn't need the alternative theory. What he is saying is there is a geographic location, there is a terminal, the terminal supplies that entire geographic area, and your product is in the terminal and it's mixed and it's sent out and that's the best he can do. That's what the theory is.

I agree that you make a very good point, sort of the better point I have heard, about interrogatory number 3. When was he supposed to tell you that?

MR. CORRELL: He should have told me the terminal he is talking about. There are several terminals.

THE COURT: I understand that argument. It is a good argument.

MR. CORRELL: You also have exculpation. They haven't

THE COURT: I don't know, but that sounds like a good argument, too. When you argue, Mr. Anderson, when you argue, Mr. Correll, I expect to see it in your opposition briefs if it has to go that way.

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Those are good arguments, Mr. Axline. I know your firm is very busy, maybe overwhelmed, but you can't come up with these ideas at the last minute when people did ask you specific questions about the facts. The first time you mentioned this commingled thing is a week ago. That is troubling.

You didn't plead it. They didn't take the discovery that might exculpate. You haven't laid out the information as to your proof with respect to the geographic areas that you are now telling me about for the first time. So there is a lot of last-minute stuff happening ten years later.

MR. AXLINE: We just have a disagreement about the level of detail that we did provide in response to those interrogatories, your Honor. We will point to the responses if it comes to that.

THE COURT: There is no dispute. They are in black and white. Whatever the responses are are in black and white.

MR. AXLINE: Yes.

THE COURT: They are filed documents. That is going to be the easiest part of the briefing. You responded what you responded and not more. If somebody sends you five letters in the course of one year and you never give them the information they ask for for a year, I don't think that looks too good for raising this a week ago at a meet-and-confer.

I think it would be wasting time to have another pre-

MR. AXLINE: We owe her a letter as to which stations

know which stations have direct evidence for Valero?

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How much longer is the negotiation on the proposed stipulation going to last?

MS. ROY: Your Honor, the real issue is the prejudice part of it. We will send them our language by Friday.

should be able to make a decision on that fairly quickly.

THE COURT: You know what he wants, preserving the right to appeal. He has to identify for you the exact opinions. He did by substance today, not by date and docket number, but he can. He will send you that right away. I think you had better take until Monday so he can send you the case law.

He can send not the case law but the cases that he wants to preserve the right to appeal. You can send him your proposed language Monday. He needs to look at it for a couple of days. I would say if there is not a stipulation by April 25th, a week from Friday, then you know what you have to do on the motion practice, period.

That's it, Mr. Axline. You either stipulate or you don't, enough to limit the motion practice and in some instances eliminate it. Some defendants may not be here for the stipulation, others might be.

Starting with April 25th, when are the defendants prepared to make their motions? And I don't want to get ten motions or eight motions. I'm very careful about briefing to make sure people cooperate on the legal issues.

If you are going to all say it's too late to invoke the alternative liability theory of commingled product, we had no discovery, we asked for interrogatories, that is one brief. I am looking at coordinating counsel now, looking at Mr.

Riccardulli and Mr. Pardo for that. That has to be coordinated.

When you have fact-specific motions, OK, I can take some fact specific ones. But I won't have ten people making the same argument about why they should be commingled. You are going to have to meet as a group and figure out who is making the generic motion. Do you understand, Mr. Pardo?

MR.PARDO: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good. There has to be a group meeting, figure that out, one brief on common issues, then short, targeted briefs on defendant-specific issues. But don't repeat the legal argument over and over.

For goodness' sake, don't tell me the summary judgment standard in the Second Circuit. Don't waste your pages on that. If you feel you must, you can do it once in the general brief, but don't waste pages on that. Get to the heart of the specifics of what you want to say.

MS. ROY: Understood, your Honor. We will absolutely coordinate.

THE COURT: Let's talk about a schedule.

MS. ROY: I'm sorry to interrupt. I just have one thing that may affect you in terms of scheduling. We focused here on really sort of the causation nuisance issues. There are other intended issues to be raised on summary judgment that we have not had your procedure of letter briefing beforehand.

THE COURT: Such as?

MS. ROY: There is likely going to be a motion on the OCWD Act and one with respect to lack of damages at certain stations. There are also, depending on how --

THE COURT: I don't take motions by issue. It's got to all be combined in one brief. Again, those would be general. The scope of the OCWD Act damages on the legal side of it, one big long brief. Case-specific, if there are specific facts, and I don't know why there would be on the OCWD Act. It's a matter of law what it covers or doesn't cover. As far as no damages, maybe that is specific per station. What else?

MS. ROY: I understand that, your Honor. My only point to you was just that we haven't engaged in your letter briefing on this issue.

THE COURT: I know.

 $\mbox{MS. ROY:}\ \mbox{We}\ \mbox{are fine going straight to the motion, if}$ that's what you refer.

THE COURT: I don't usually, but we have been down this road so often. In this MDL I don't know that the delay is worth it. But I do want to coordinate the briefing. That I feel most strongly about. If I get flooded with ten 25-page briefs, I will reject them all and start over again; it will be a total waste of time. I'm not reading 250 pages.

The common issues, even including the ones you just

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raised, like the scope of OCWDA, has to be one common brief. It is all part of the same 25 pages as the other issue as to why there can't be commingled product theory. We have to have page limits. We don't make separate motions on issues. called point 1 and point 2 and point 3 in the same brief, all one motion.

That said, let's talk about when the briefs can come Don't start counting until April 25th in the hope of narrowing the issues by stipulation. Starting then, can defendants make all motions by May 23rd, which is four weeks? That gives time for coordination. Then we will talk again specifically about page limits.

MS. DOYLE: Your Honor, I am concerned about the time line a bit. In our situation we are going to have to be move on 34 stations. We have prepared, the group has, and is working jointly on the joint motion, the practice that you want us to do, but we still have a lot of additional work to do because only recently did we learn that we need to go to expand to all 34 stations.

THE COURT: I don't understand expand. What does that mean, expand to 34 stations? You're not filing 34 briefs. don't even know what you are talking about. He owes you a letter, he said so already, or the lady next to you. Where he has direct evidence at specific stations, you will He says he will update the final matrix on that.

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Everything else is the alternative theory. There is nothing specific about it. It's a matter of the terminals and the transportation system, and he's got the burden of proof initially and then it would switch to you to exculpate. You can say there is no proof. Basically, your work is going to be on the reply brief, as far as I can tell on that.

But let's go back to my schedule. I do think you should be able to move by May 23rd. As you said, you have been prepping up already. That's a ways off.

Then the response, Mr. Axline? I realize you are responding to a number of different briefs. That is significant. If you get the briefs May 23rd, I would give you until July 7th because you are going to be responding to a lot of material.

MR. AXLINE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Then reply briefs would be July 28th. It is going to be a long schedule, but hopefully you will resolve all the open issues.

With respect to these briefs, the joint brief will be the usual 25-25-10 on common legal issues. With respect to defendant-specific issues, I'd like to limit that to 15-15-7. You have to be specific with specific facts about your station. There are many of you. I'm going to get flooded as it is.

I don't see any point in having another conference.

Is there anything more that we should be discussing? I have

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set a lengthy schedule so you have time to respond to everybody. But the more work you can do up front to limit these motions, Mr. Axline, the better off we will all be.

MR. AXLINE: Yes, your Honor.

MS. ROY: Your Honor, may I ask for one thing?

Because there are so many issues, would it be possible to extend the number of pages for exhibits so we can give you enough evidence?

THE COURT: Yes, that is possible. To what? I have already allowed 225 pages. Everybody points that out to me. They always say, you said five affidavits with X number of pages. Everybody then aggregates and says, well, it's a total of 225 pages, do you care how it is distributed. I have been getting that for years. It is a lot of pages. You have to think about his on the receiving end.

MS. ROY: I understand that, your Honor. It's just with 34 stations it is a challenge.

THE COURT: It is not individual evidence. That is your entire point. It may be that at some stations there is direct evidence. The remainder is this theory. There isn't direct evidence to rebut. I don't think you are fighting 34 individual cases on summary judgment.

The answer to that is there will be fact issues to be tried. If it was here is his evidence and here is my evidence -- this is not a trial on paper. This is for legal

issues. It is for undisputed facts. Lawyers have a very poor understanding of the summary judgment process, in my opinion.

It is not hard. If you are dumping that much paper, I'm going to say there must be an issue of fact, they put in 500 pages each. It's crazy. It's not called a trial on paper. That is not what summary judgment is. Please remember what it is.

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There is a strong legal issue here, as you know, on whether he can fall back on this alternative theory at all, whether there is an anchor defendant, are others liable, etc. That's fine. When I said there might be specific station issues, it may be that although he says he has evidence that I'm there, he hasn't shown any, there's none. That's when he is not using the alternative theory but claims he has evidence. You show it as none, fine. If you're going to start disputing facts, I'm not trying cases on paper. That's not my job.

MR. CONDRON: Two quick questions. There are a couple of issues that are a little bit discreet. Ms. Weirick's client and mine have a specific issue with respect to res judicata based on an earlier suit brought against us by the Orange County distributor to your Honor.

THE COURT: Can you combine?

MR. CONDRON: Yes, absolutely, we will do that.

THE COURT: That one can be a separate 15-15-7.

MR. CONDRON: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: The other quick question, since it's 6

1 o'clock?

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MR. CONDRON: Yes. Not all of the issues necessarily are based on this type of causation. We have one at a particular station where the plaintiffs' expert basically said -- you may recall the Anthony Brown issue in the New Jersey case where he said I need to do more investigation because I can't find anything I need to do right now, I don't see any threat that this poses to a water well and I don't see any threat or I can't identify any specific threat.

THE COURT: It sounds like this is no case.

MR. CONDRON: Exactly.

THE COURT: Talk to Mr. Axline. If you can't, that is amenable to a motion. It shouldn't have to be made. If there is no evidence, there is no evidence. If that's what the expert said, it is laughable, he doesn't have a case right now at that station.

MR. CONDRON: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. ROY: Your Honor, I'm sorry, one issue. Just a housekeeping matter. We had a May 1st hearing on calendar in this matter.

THE COURT: To do the pre-motions in this very instance? I just said no. Thank you. I'll take it off May 1st.

(Adjourned)